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ABSTRACT  
I articulate a view according to which an important difference between undermining and overriding 
defeaters is that the former require the subject to engage in some higher-order epistemic thinking, 
while the latter don’t. With the help of some examples, I argue that underminers push the cognizer to 
reflect on the way she formed a belief by challenging the epistemic worthiness of either the source of 
justification or the specific justificatory process. By contrast, overriders needn’t pose any such 
challenge. I also provide some details on how undermining defeat works in different cases. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The notion of undermining (aka undercutting) defeat is acquiring increasing relevance in 
epistemology in virtue of its connection with many issues, such as the relationship between higher-
order evidence and ordinary evidence, the debate on peer disagreement, and the debate between 
dogmatism and conservatism in the philosophy of perception.1 This paper is concerned with the 
understanding of the nature of undermining defeat, regardless of its bearing on any other debate. 
In a recent paper critical of Pollock’s account of the way epistemic defeaters work, Scott 
Sturgeon (2012) argued that while overriders (aka rebutters) generate their distinctive kind of pressure 
on their own, underminers “generate it only in concert with higher-order commitments about the 
                                                     
1 For two examples of how undermining defeat plays a role in those debates, see Christensen (2010) and Pryor 
(ms). 
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basing of lower-order belief”. Some years before, Albert Casullo (2003: 45-6) observed that “[t]ypical 
undermining defeaters show either that the source [of justification] is defective in some way […], or 
that the source is operating in an environment for which it was not well adapted”. I take the two 
passages to inspire the view according to which underminers pertain to what we might call ‘the 
higher-level of belief-management’, while overriders can be limited to what we might call ‘the lower-
level of belief reception and rejection’. This paper explores this view and sketches some of its details. 
 
 2. THE VIEW AND A PROBLEM 
 
The distinction between undermining and overriding defeaters has been introduced by John Pollock 
(1974: 42-3). Let p be a previously justified proposition (for a subject S at a time t): while overriders 
overtly suggest that not-p, underminers don’t. Instead, they are reasons to believe that the justification 
is not strong enough to justify belief in p.2 Consider the following examples, where e is the evidence, 
p the proposition the subject is justified to believe, and d the defeater3 (and e and d are the only pieces 
of evidence relevant for p that are available to the subject):4 
 
(1) e = <Andreas says that puffins are a species of mosquitoes>  
 p = <Puffins fly> 
 d = <Filippo tells me that Andreas’s knowledge in naturalistic matters is poor> 
 
(2) e = <I remember having left the book on the desk> 
                                                     
2 As it will be evident by my constant reference in cases where the belief is based on some evidence, I’m 
working with a notion of doxastic justification. 
3 I will appeal to justificational triads e, p, d throughout and, for ease of exposition, I will take e, p and d to be 
propositions. However, I don’t wish to commit myself to the claim that all evidence is propositional, but only to 
the much weaker claim that for every piece of evidence available to a subject, there is a proposition that can be 
used to represent it. 
4 The parenthetic remark is meant to rule out cases of epistemic overdetermination, where the subject has access 
to other pieces of information for or against p, besides the mentioned e and p. 
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 p = <The book is on the desk> 
 d = <I now see that the book is not on the desk> 
It can quickly be seen that while d in (2) entails that not-p,5 d in (1) suggests that the source of 
justification is not trustworthy, but it is compatible with p. In (2) we have an overrider; in (1) we have 
an underminer.  
Let’s recall the two remarks that inspire the view I wish to explore. Sturgeon claimed that 
while overriders generate their distinctive kind of pressure on their own, underminers “generate it 
only in concert with higher-order commitments about the basing of lower-order belief”. If we look at 
example (1) again, we can see that d appeals to the commitment that the belief that puffins fly was 
based on Andreas’s testimony—in other words: d couldn’t do its defeating job, unless that 
commitment (or some other very similar to it) were in place. No similar commitment is appealed to in 
example (2): d would have been an equally effective defeater if, say, the belief that the book is on the 
desk were warranted by testimony rather than memory.6 
The second inspiring remark comes from Casullo: “[t]ypical undermining defeaters show 
either that the source [of justification] is defective in some way […], or that the source is operating in 
an environment for which it was not well adapted”. Again, look at example (1): the suggestion is 
precisely that the source is not reliable with respect to the subject matter. In example (2), on the other 
hand, no suggestion is made with respect to the defectiveness of the source, or its working in a 
problematic environment. 
Putting the two suggestions together, we can thus formulate the following view: 
 
 (View #1) Underminers suggest that something was wrong with the source of justification, 
and they operate their defeat by appealing to the higher-order commitment that the belief in 
question was based on that source.  
                                                     
5 Assuming that ‘see’ is factive. 
6 In general, underminers appear to be source-sensitive (they defeat only the justification provided by a specific 
source), while overriders appear to be source-neutral (they defeat regardless of the source of justification). This 
difference, noted by Casullo (2003:45-6), might very well be a symptom of the feature Sturgeon describes.  
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The question from which I shall begin my investigation is: what exactly are the suggestions made by 
the underminers with respect to the source? 
In the already mentioned passage, Casullo provides a twofold reply: underminers typically 
show that the source is defective, or that it is working in an environment for which it is not well 
adapted.  
However, on a common understanding of the notion of source, we can easily come across 
cases in which neither of the two options offered by Casullo seem to apply. If by ‘source of 
justification’ we mean something on a quite large scale, like the five senses, memory, introspection, 
and whatever mental ability might deliver a priori justification,7 the following example appears to 
pose a problem for (View #1): 
  
(3) e = <[S’s apparent proof of p]> 
 p = <[a seemingly logical theorem]>8 
 d = <A logician tells S that there’s a mistake in the proof> 
 
In this case it seems natural to individuate the relevant source of justification in the subject’s proving 
abilities, as it were. Suppose that S is generally good at proving theorems, that the proof wasn’t 
especially difficult, and that there were no disturbing elements involved, such as having had too much 
wine, or having executed the calculation in a noisy place. If so, the underminer does not suggest either 
that the source was defective (we are supposing that the agent is generally good at carrying out proofs, 
and he is surely allowed an occasional mistake), or that it was not operating in the proper environment 
(we are supposing that there were no disturbing elements). What does the underminer suggest with 
respect to the defectiveness of the source—or, more generally, with respect to the defectiveness of the 
subject’s basis of belief—in case (3)? 
                                                     
7 This is the notion of source endorsed by Casullo himself (2003: 35-38).  
8 Square brackets are meant to suggest that e and p are propositions, rather than the mere stand-in for 
propositions that are inside the brackets. 
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3. THE DIFFERENCE IN THE EFFECT OF UNDERMINING AND OVERRIDING DEFEATERS 
 
I believe that, in order to make sense of case (3), we need to focus the attention on something of a 
rather smaller scale than the sources of justification. A notion that might be helpful here is that of 
‘justificatory process’. Let us agree that a justificatory process begins with the gathering of the 
evidence and ends with the formation of the belief.9 The reason why I think that this notion is helpful 
is that it’s perfectly fine for a non-defective source to, occasionally, bring about a defective 
justificatory process (unless one is bold enough to impose the rather demanding requirement that a 
source of justification has to be infallible). 
In case (3) the justificatory process consists mainly in the actual flawed proof produced by the 
subject, and the natural thought concerning the suggestion made by d is that the process, rather than 
the source, was defective in some way. This is a suggestion concerning the higher-order commitment 
that the belief that p was based on that particular alleged proof, and it is an open challenge to the 
opinion that it was a good idea to base the belief that p on that specific alleged proof. Therefore, it is 
perfectly in line with the view under exploration. We might now try to reformulate the proposal: 
  
(View #2) Underminers suggest that something was wrong with the source of justification or 
with the justificatory process, and they operate their defeat by appealing to the higher-order 
commitment that the belief in question was based on that source or that process. 
  
However, the appeal to justificatory processes generates another worry. Whereas it’s plausible that 
overriders say nothing about the defectiveness of the source (think about case (2): d does not suggest 
that memory is a bad source), things are not so when it comes to justificatory processes. Indeed, it 
seems that overriders suggest that the justificatory process was defective in some way too. Recall that 
                                                     
9 The choice to focus on evidence-supported justified beliefs is not due to a disregard for other options, but only 
to a desire to keep the exposition as simple as possible.  
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overriders say or entail that not-p, where p is the proposition previously justified for subject S. Now, 
since surely one of the epistemic goals is to believe what is true, if S formed the belief that p, and p is 
false, something must have gone wrong in the epistemic path that led S to believe p. If so, the way in 
which underminers and overriders work doesn’t look that different after all. 
Here is a reply: the way in which underminers and overriders suggest that the justificatory 
process was defective is different. Overriders merely suggest that the justificatory process failed to 
lead to truth, underminers suggest that a disturbing event (like a mistake in the proof) has caused the 
process to fail. The former suggestion is perfectly compatible with the justificatory process having 
been executed impeccably, and having being delivered by a reliable source working in good 
circumstances; the latter is not. I wish to defend this line of reply by considering the examples.10 
Example (1) is not problematic for the view, since d clearly says that the source (Andreas’s 
testimony) wasn’t reliable. The problematic case was (3), and we should now compare it with the 
overriding in (2) to see if we still have a difference. As we have seen, d in (3) it suggests that there 
was a mistake in the justificatory process (the alleged proof). By contrast, in (2), the overrider 
(obtained by looking at the desk, and seeing that there was no book) does not suggest anything with 
respect to either the defectiveness of the source, its working in adverse circumstances, or the 
occurrence of some mistake, or of any other disturbing event, in the justificatory process.11 All that (2) 
seems to suggest with respect to the justificatory process is that it failed to lead to truth, and it’s in the 
nature of justificatory processes originated by fallible sources of justification to occasionally fail to 
produce a true belief. It might be that, under close examination, the failure to produce a true belief in 
(2) turns out to be due to some glitch in the justificatory process (maybe I didn’t inspect my memories 
                                                     
10 There might be another reply available here: in a nutshell, one could agree that both overriders and 
underminers suggest that something went wrong in the justificatory process, but still contend that while the 
consideration of that thought plays a role in the process of belief revision generated by an underminer, it needn’t 
play any role in the belief-revision process generated by an overrider. 
11 It’s worth saying something on the notion of disturbing event at this stage. By ‘disturbing event’ I mean 
something that interfered with the justificatory process and caused its failure. I take disturbing events to belong 
to two main categories: those for which the agent can be blamed (e.g. a mistake in a proof due to carelessness), 
and those for which the agent cannot be blamed (e.g. the acquisition of a false information from a reliable 
source). 
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carefully, or I was given some memory-distorting drug), but it needn’t be so. And, more importantly 
for our purposes, the overrider does not suggest that things are so.12 
Another example should help to make the point more vivid: 
 
(4) e = <All swans observed at t1 are white>  
 p = <All swans are white> 
 d = <At t2 a black swan is observed in Australia> 
  
Again, the overrider here does not challenge either the reliability of the source (inductive 
observation), its working in the proper environment, or the good standing of the specific inductive 
process. All that the overrider suggests is that that particular induction failed to lead to truth, and that 
is perfectly compatible with the induction being executed impeccably (say, a very high number of 
observations were made, they were all singularly carried out with care, etc.). Just like it seems to be in 
the normal course of events that sometimes memory delivers a false piece of information, so it’s in the 
normal course of events that inductions are sometimes proven wrong. 
Let me reformulate the view one more time: 
 
(View #3) Underminers suggest that something was wrong with the source of justification or 
with the justificatory process, and they operate their defeat by appealing to the higher-order 
commitment that the belief in question was based on that source or that process. If the 
suggestion is that the process, rather than the source, was defective, the defectiveness is to be 
understood as the occurrence of a mistake or some other disturbing event. 
 
                                                     
12 One could argue that faculties like memory and perception, if they are working at the best of their possibilities 
in optimal circumstances cannot deliver a false belief. On this view, the acknowledgment that memory and 
perception are not infallible is, at bottom, an acknowledgement that they hardly ever work at their best in 
optimal circumstances. If this view is correct, there is a sense in which overriders entail that something went 
wrong in the process in the sense I attach to underminers. However, the point stands that overriders do not 
suggest that things are so, and don’t need things to be so to defeat the subject’s original belief. 
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4. MORE DETAILS 
 
I will now try to be a little bit more specific about what happens when a cognizer accepts an 
underminer. In line with the examples already presented, I use propositional triads to represent in a 
schematic way the pieces of information available to the subject when she encounters a defeater: 
 
e = <evidence> 
p = <supported proposition> 
d = <defeater> 
 
My contention is that when d is an underminer, it suggests something with respect to e or to the 
relationship between e and p. By contrast, when d is an overrider, there needn’t be any such 
suggestion. More precisely, when d is an underminer, the suggestion might be that: 
 
(a) e—the evidence for p—is not true13 
(b) e does not support p 
(c) there is no justification for e 
(d) there is no justification for the claim that e supports p 
 
Let me go back to the examples already considered to show how this connects with what I have 
already said. In (1) d does not impinge on the truth of e; instead, it appears to suggest that e does not 
support p, on the grounds that the source which delivered p is defective (unreliable with respect to the 
subject matter). On the other hand, in (3) d does not challenge the claim that e, if true, would support 
p—the execution of logical calculations by a competent subject is a good way of knowing about 
logical theorems—but it does challenge the truth of e: at least if e is composed by the conjunction of 
                                                     
13 The specification that e is evidence for p is meant to make it clear that the suggestion made by the underminer 
is a higher-order one.  
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the statements which make up the alleged proof, then the logician’s claim that there is a mistake in the 
proof amounts to saying that at least one of the statements involved is false, and thus the conjunction 
which includes them all is false as well. By contrast, consider the cases of overriding defeat in (2) and 
(4): neither the truth of e, nor the support relation holding between e and p are challenged by the 
overrider d. 
I will now present two more examples, just to illustrate how features (c) and (d) might be 
instantiated. Here’s the first, instantiating (c). Let’s assume that when there is a railway workers’ 
strike, the company affected usually advices its customers to check in advance whether the train they 
are booked on will travel or not. 
 
(5) e = <A train to Edinburgh will depart tomorrow at noon> [as learned by checking the station’s  
  timetable] 
 p = <The train will get to Edinburgh tomorrow afternoon> 
 d = <The newspaper says that a railway workers’ strike has been called for tomorrow> 
 
Does d here suggest that e is false? It wouldn’t seem so. If the advice of the company is to be taken at 
face value, upon learning that a strike is announced, the subject is not able to assign a truth-value to a 
proposition like <Train T will travel>.14  
Does d in (5) suggest that e is not relevant for p? Not really. Learning that a railway workers’ 
strike has been called does not appear to question that checking the timetable provides evidence for 
forming beliefs about train travel times—the evidence in the case at hand is not as strong as it would 
be on a strike-free day, but it is nevertheless a decent piece of evidence: it is enough to make it 
worthwhile continuing the investigation and getting in touch with the railway company. 
                                                     
14 One might think that the suggestion here is that e is false, but that the suggestion isn’t strong enough to 
warrant belief in the falsity of e. I don’t disagree with this way of putting it; it’s just that I understand the 
suggestion made by the underminer to be the higher-order thought—about the basing of the first-order belief—
that the thinker is warranted to believe. And what the thinker is warranted to believe in this case is that there is 
no justification to believe that e is true, not that that e—the evidence for p—is false. 
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What d does in (5) is to provide the cognizer with a good reason to doubt that e is the case, thereby 
pushing him to suspend his judgment over e. After having acquired d, he is no longer in the position 
to commit himself to the truth of e, but neither he is in the position to commit himself to the falsity of 
e. The suggestion then would be that there is no justification for e, and that would account for the 
defectiveness of the justificatory process (the source does not seem to be problematic here)15: its early 
stages, namely the evidence-gathering stages, are hindered by circumstances such that it’s not clear 
whether the proposition representing the evidence can be accepted. 
One more example, to illustrate feature (d): 
 
(6) e = <My experience is in all respects as if I saw Stephan entering the building> 
 p = <Stephan is in the building> 
 d = <Bob has just told me that Paula was determined to put some hallucinatory pills in my tea> 
 
What does d suggest here? Not that e isn’t true: the content of the relevant experience is not called 
into question by d. For the same reason the suggestion made by d can’t be that there is no justification 
for e. What about the claim that e supports p? Just like in the previous case, I think that, upon learning 
that d, the subject is still in the position to accept the claim that e supports p: the degree of support 
that e provides for p is not as strong as it would be in a situation devoid of d, but it would seem that e 
still supports p to some degree. To make the case more plausible, let’s suppose that, thanks to some 
background information, I figure that Paula had about 50% chances of succeeding in adding some 
hallucinatory pill to my drink without me noticing. If so, it appears reasonable to withhold the belief 
in the claim that e supports p: what d seems to suggest is that there is no justification for the claim that 
e supports p. A way, maybe familiar by now, to summarize the story just told is: the underminer here 
suggests that the source of justification might not have been working in good enough circumstances.16 
                                                     
15 It might be a little tricky to specify the source here. One option might be: vision plus the required theoretical 
luggage needed to read timetables. 
16 This example pushes for a further refinement on (View #3): the suggestion made by underminers with respect 
to the source or the process can be either that they were defective, or that they might have been defective. 
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5. MIXED CASES 
 
Let’s backtrack a bit: I have endorsed—and tried to provide some details of—a view according to 
which underminers do their work by interacting with some higher-order commitment concerning the 
basing of the belief, and that they do so by challenging the epistemic worthiness of the relevant 
commitments. On the other hand, overriders don’t need to interact with higher-order commitments 
concerning the basing of the target belief, and don’t have to challenge them. The examples discussed 
lend support to the view I have defended. 
However, nothing seems to forbid that, in principle, there are mixed cases: overriders that do 
interact with some higher-order commitment about the basing of the target belief, and that do 
challenge the way in which the belief was formed. Here’s an example: 
 
(7) e = <The sun moves around the earth>  
 p = <The sun orbits the earth> 
 d = <The best astronomical theory that we have today says that the earth orbits the sun> 
  
Suppose the cognizer is a relatively grown-up school kid, and that she gets e by observation, while she 
learns d in school. There seems to be a sense in which she is mandated to reason along lines similar to 
the following: 
 
Astronomy says that the earth orbits the sun, yet I believe I saw the sun moving around in the sky and 
on that basis I formed the belief that the sun orbited the earth. Thus, science has contradicted what I’ve 
seen. Is there anything wrong in my vision? It doesn’t seem so, I can rely very well on my vision when 
I play football or when I cross the  streets. Eureka! There are some things for which vision is good for 
and others for which it is not good for: forming beliefs about the movements of the stars is one of the 
things that vision is not good for; forming beliefs about the position of the ball in the football pitch is a 
thing that vision is good for.  
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We might suppose that the reasoning just presented relied on a higher-order commitment like “school 
teachers are always right (in school related matters)”, which makes it the case that d could call into 
question the epistemic quality of the other higher-order commitment “my belief that the sun orbits the 
earth is based on vision”.17 In this reading of case (7), the acceptance of the overrider pushed the 
young cognizer to reflect on the way in which the belief was formed, the final suggestion being that e 
was false (because the source was not dealing with a subject matter for which it was well adapted). I 
call this a case of ‘impure overriding’ because the overrider behaved in an underminer-like way.18  
Note, however, that the effectiveness of the overrider, or even its acceptance, is not dependent 
on the higher-order reasoning of the sort just presented. The school kid could have accepted the 
overrider, given up her belief in p, and at the same time remained unreflective about the way in which 
the belief in p was formed. Such behaviour is probably not ideal, but it doesn’t seem that epistemic 
rationality forbids it. In the case of undermining defeaters, however, things appear to be different: if 
the view I’ve tried to sketch is on the right track, a cognizer cannot accept an underminer, and at the 
same time remain unreflective about the way in which her belief was formed.19 
To conclude, let me briefly draw the general moral of this story. Calling into question the way 
the belief was formed is a crucial part of the way in which underminers work, and accepting that one’s 
justification has been undermined requires some reflection on how the belief was formed. It is in this 
sense that underminers pertain to the level of belief-management: they require the subject to worry 
about the way her beliefs are formed, retained, and abandoned. 
 
 
 
                                                     
17 Or, maybe more precisely, “vision plus the theoretical luggage needed to handle notions like orbit, 
astronomical theory, sun, earth”. 
18 Jim Pryor (ms: § 2), by using a framework different than mine, comes to the conclusion that there are cases of 
mixed overriding/undermining defeat. 
19 In other words, it is a consequence of the view presented that unreflective agents cannot suffer undermining 
defeat. 
13 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I wish to thank everyone at the Northern Institute of Philosophy for creating such a supportive 
environment, and especially Crispin Wright, Carrie Jenkins, and Federico Luzzi for discussions and 
feedback that have been crucial in shaping the ideas here presented. A predecessor of the present 
article was presented at the SIFA Graduate Conference, at the University of Cagliari in September 
2013: I am grateful to the organizers and the participants for constructive and helpful comments. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Casullo, A. (2003). A Priori Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Christensen, D. (2010). Higher-Order Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81 (1), 185-215. 
Pollock, J. L. (1974). Knowledge and Justification. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Pryor, J. (ms). Problems for Credulism. To appear in Tucker, C. Seemings and Justification: New Essays on 
Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://www.jimpryor.net/ 
research/papers/ Credulism.pdf. Accessed 15 August 2013. 
Sturgeon, S. (2012). ‘Pollock on Defeasible Reasons’.  Philosophical Studies, published online: 17 April 2012. 
http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11098-012-9891-x.pdf  
 
